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ABSTRACT 
There is growing concern within the public health community that the rapid decline of new 
antibiotics over the last two decades, coupled with the adaptive nature of bacterial infections, 
could lead to widespread disease without effective treatments. It is difficult for pharmaceutical 
companies to recoup the billions of dollars invested in the research and development (R&D) of 
new antibiotics because bacterial infections are treated with older antibiotics first and for short 
dosage periods to stymie antibiotic resistance. Without a means to recoup their R&D costs and 
enduring shareholder demands for profit-maximizing endeavors, many companies shut down 
their antibiotics labs in favor of more profitable medications, like those for chronic illnesses that 
require continual administration for extended periods. In an effort to stimulate more antibiotic 
R&D, the United States passed the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act in 2012 to 
motivate companies to bring more antibiotic treatments to market. This paper aims to explain the 
supply and demand problems of the current market for antibiotics and analyze GAIN’s impact on 
R&D investment. After examining the amount of antibiotics in clinical trials before and after the 
GAIN Act, there was insufficient statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that GAIN altered 
the behavior of companies. This Act does not offer enough incentives to counteract the unique 
market anomaly antibiotics present. Without a continual robust antibiotic pipeline, bacterial 
infections, including new strains of antibiotic-resistant infections, will be untreatable. This study 
has public health significance because it highlights the urgent nature of providing additional 
incentives to companies that invest in antibiotics R&D, without which, there will be few options 
to treat bacterial infections in the future. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The 1928 discovery of the first antibiotic, penicillin, transformed healthcare by curing infections 
that previously, were often fatal illnesses.1 As more antibiotics were discovered and successful 
treatment of infections became routine, pharmaceutical companies shifted investment from short-
term use medications, like antibiotics, to more long-term use medications, like those for chronic 
illnesses.2 This modification in research goals benefited public health and allowed companies to 
be more profitable. However it overlooked the evolving nature of bacterial infections, which 
requires a consistent and robust antibiotic pipeline to effectively fight infections. Given the 
previously stated shift in drug development, the current antibiotic pipeline is small. From 1983 to 
1987, 16 new antibiotics gained FDA approval.3 From 1993-1997, 10 antibiotics received FDA 
approval.4 Further declines occurred from 2003 to 2007, when only five antibiotics received 
FDA approval and from 2007-2012, only two were approved.5 Pharmaceutical companies need 
more federal incentives to motivate them to re-invest in a product that does not follow standard 
supply and demand principles. 
This paper aims to analyze the current industry trends and issues facing the antibiotics 
market and evaluate the 2012 GAIN Act. While it is critical that antibiotics are developed for 
antibiotic-resistant strains of bacteria, this research project focuses on the need for additional 
government incentives to create a robust antibiotic pipeline. Currently, the 2012 GAIN Act (and 
to a much smaller extent, the 1983 Orphan Drug Act) incentivizes R&D for antibiotics for 
specific Qualified Infectious Disease Products (QIDP). The main objective is to determine if 
there was a measurable difference in the behaviors of companies’ antibiotics pipelines since the 
introduction of GAIN. Given GAIN’s small incentives for QIDP’s, I hypothesized that there 
would be a small change in industry behavior, but found that there was not a statistically 
significant change. Armed with this information, policymakers and governmental agencies can 
make informed decisions regarding future incentive programs to stimulate antibiotic pipelines.   
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The antibiotics industry operates within the profit-driven pharmaceutical industry. 
Despite that, the antibiotics industry does not follow the typical supply-demand structure of other 
medications. In a typical market, when demand rises, more manufacturers enter the market in 
hopes of gaining a profit. Demand is intensifying for new antibiotics. A marked increase in 
antibiotic-resistant infections indicates that current antibiotics are not as effective as in the past. 
In theory, fiercely competitive pharmaceutical companies should respond to market demands and 
invest in antibiotic R&D.  However, unlike typical supply-demand market trends, the antibiotics 
market does not reward companies—even when demand is high and supply is low. This 
counterintuitive structure lies with the treatment of bacterial infections, which are treated with 
older antibiotics first for short periods of time.6 While this prescribing method is beneficial for 
society, it is not appealing to companies. It is not profitable for pharmaceutical companies to 
invest billions of dollars into R&D for new antibiotics if they cannot recover the investment. 
Encouraging companies to re-invest in antibiotics is imperative and can only be done with some 
legislative interventions in a timely manner. 
Policies can encourage R&D for unmet medical needs by offering incentives.  The 1983 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA) was the first to do so, offering incentives to companies that bring 
therapeutic treatments to market for diseases that affect 200,000 individuals or less.7 Companies 
have obtained orphan drug status for antibiotics that target new strains of antibiotic-resistant 
bacterial infections.8 Another policy is GAIN, which provides certain incentives to those 
bringing qualified infectious disease products (QIDP) to market. However, it does not offer 
enough protection to offset the risks taken when developing medications or the need to replenish 
antibiotics for more common bacterial infections. The GAIN Act relies too heavily on traditional 
tools used to stimulate R&D for an untraditional market. Given the counterintuitive nature of the 
antibiotics market, new policies should offer incentives that balance the risks.  
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The brand-name antibiotic industry is nestled within the larger framework of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  The pharmaceutical industry is inherently profit-driven because their survival rests on 
the high-risk decisions made in the development of new medications. Companies take enormous 
risks when developing drugs that are safe, effective, and innovative.  They must recoup their 
losses from compounds that failed to be brought to market, often due to safety and efficacy 
concerns.  To balance this risk, they are rewarded with sole market privileges for the protected 
compound during patent exclusivity periods (typically 20 years).9   
The development process begins with New Molecular Entities (NME), which are newly 
discovered compounds that have potential to lead to therapeutic treatments.10 Once a compound 
is discovered, the manufacturer must decide if it has a realistic chance of coming to market. The 
right decision is crucial to a company’s well being.  Only 8% of drugs that go through phase I 
trials are approved for use.11  It was estimated that in the year 2014, a company could spend 
nearly $2.6 billion to bring a drug to market—this estimate includes the failed attempts to bring 
other drugs to market.12 If too many NME do not receive approval, investment capital will be 
drained.     
Companies create thousands of molecular compounds from drug discovery research.13 
The industry lobbying group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
estimates that of the 5,000-10,000 compounds from drug discovery, only 250 will enter pre-
clinical testing to determine potential.14 Of those estimated 250 compounds, only 5 will undergo 
clinical trials.15 Each NME within any given pharmaceutical manufacturer is required to undergo 
the same stages of clinical trials on humans to be eligible for FDA approval.16  
Phase I Trials: A small group of healthy human subjects will take the trial drug to test for 
safety. Phase I trial size ranges from 20-100 volunteers.17 
Phase II Trials: Efficacy and further safety testing occur in this phase with a sample size 
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that is larger than phase I.  This group should have the condition for which the 
medication is meant to treat. Phase II trial size ranges 100-500 volunteers.18 
Phase III Trials: These clinical trials have large sample sizes.  This phase is meant to test 
the efficacy of the medication against the placebo and pinpoint side effects to the 
medication. Phase III trial size ranges from 1,000-5,000 volunteers.19 
Clinical trials typically take 6-7 years to complete.20 The failure rate is extremely high and 
failure in late stage development is extremely costly.  Only one of five drugs that enter clinical 
trials will receive FDA approval. Depending on the type of medication being developed, the 
clinical research phases may be much longer. For example, medications that treat chronic 
illnesses require larger sample sizes and longer trials to establish long-term efficacy and side 
effects.  While longer development time does require additional resources, the manufacturer can 
expect patients to take their drug throughout their patent protection period, and the price will 
reflect this longer trial phase.  Once the medication has undergone all safety and efficacy testing, 
the company will apply for FDA final approval and bring the medication to market. 
2.1 ANTIBIOTICS INDUSTRY 
The antibiotics industry, in its current state, is relatively small, resulting in a steady decline of 
antibiotic medications brought to market. At its peak, in the 1940’s-1950’s, there were 11 major 
pharmaceutical companies actively participating in R&D for antibiotics.  Today, there is only a 
handful, and most of them have just recently re-entered the market in the last few years.21 The 
result has been a steadily declining pipeline, from 11 major antibiotics discoveries from 1940-
1960 to only 4 from 1960-2003.22 
The antibiotics industry operates under the same assumptions and regulations as the 
larger pharmaceutical industry. The demand is building to create new medications to treat 
bacterial infections, which are always evolving to become resistant to antibiotics.  The market 
has not rewarded companies who develop strong medications, because “best practice” treatment 
of bacterial infections dictates that healthcare providers prescribe the older antibiotics first and 
for the shortest time possible.23  Research supports this practice as an effective way to decrease 
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antibiotic resistance. Other factors of increasing antibiotic resistance include, inappropriate 
prescribing and widespread use of antibiotics in livestock. 
Recently, there are been several cases of gram-negative antibiotic resistant “superbugs” 
that have returned attention to this issue.24 As these bacteria continue to evolve and impact 
healthcare systems, the antibiotics industry will be under increasing pressure to produce new 
antibiotics.  Antibiotics are distinctly different from other medications because they are 
developed to fight and kill bacterial infections. Bacterial infections do not discriminate—
affecting both young and older individuals.   They can evolve by modifying existing proteins to 
develop antibiotic resistance, a practice known as bacterial metabolism.25. This distinction makes 
antibiotic medications unlike those for chronic illnesses, as they need to continually develop new 
drugs to fight constantly adapting bacteria.  
The development of antibiotics marked a pivotal point in medical history because they 
were able to cure bacterial infections that were once considered fatal.  After their conception in 
1908, the medical community marveled at their capabilities and considered them a worthwhile 
investment.  Today, health experts argue that perhaps antibiotics have been too successful—
leading people to undervalue them because the devastation of common infections has been 
forgotten. Along with this form of “pseudo-amnesia”, many antibiotics have surpassed their 
patent protection periods.  Therefore, the pricing of the most used antibiotics are the least 
expensive.  Patients have become accustomed to these low prices—leading them to further 
distance the actual value of a medication from its benefits. 
2.1.1 INAPPROPRIATE PRESCRIBING PATTERNS 
A rapidly diminishing antibiotics pipeline is further complicated by their overuse. Patient 
misconceptions about the role of antibiotics (i.e. bacterial and viral infections) increase pressure 
on physicians to inappropriately prescribe antibiotics because it is more manageable to prescribe 
than to educate a patient during a ten-minute office visit. This practice harms the industry by 
providing the bacteria with an opportunity to modify their protein structure—assisting bacteria in 
becoming resistant to antibiotics.  If a patient has a viral infection, like a cold, it cannot be fought 
with antibiotics.  Patients often ask for an antibiotic to help.  Conversely, physicians feel pressure 
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to stay on schedule within their ten-minute visit and prescribe the antibiotic inappropriately 
because it takes less time than explaining the differences between bacterial and viral infections.  
The introduction of an antibiotic to a person’s system aids in antibiotic resistance because it 
allows more opportunities for bacteria to adapt to the antibiotic. The CDC estimates that 50% of 
antibiotic prescriptions are inappropriately prescribed. 26 
2.1.2 ANTIBIOTIC USE IN LIVESTOCK 
An estimated 80% of antibiotics sold in the U.S. are used by the meat industry.27  Livestock live 
in close quarters, providing a breeding ground for bacteria to grow.  While there have not been 
any studies that link antibiotic use in livestock to growing antibiotic resistance, many public 
health experts suspect that this is happening.28  Antibiotic use in livestock is largely unregulated, 
although some antibiotics are being monitored because overuse occurred when farmers 
discovered that it helped livestock grow faster.29  The widespread use in livestock affects the 
market for new antibiotics because experts suspect it provides opportunities for bacteria to 
modify to build resistance to antibiotics. 
2.2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ANTIBIOTICS INDUSTRY 
There are around 90,000 hospital-acquired infections per year in the U.S., and 70% of them are 
from antibiotic-resistant bacteria.30  Another common infection that is often difficult to treat 
because it is highly resistant to current antibiotic treatments is Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).  In the U.S., there are around 100,000 cases, leading to 
approximately 20,000 deaths per year.31  
The costs of drug-resistant bacteria are very high, accounting for $200 million per year.32  
Many people require hospitalization while they are fighting these types of infections.  If hospital 
costs for patients with drug-resistant infections are added, the overall cost of treating these 
infections rises to approximately $30 billion per year.33  As the number of these infections (and 
their associated costs) rise, more groups will begin to call for antibiotic research.  This attention 
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will benefit the antibiotics industry because information regarding the poor reimbursement 
system for novel treatments will highlight the dwindling options available to healthcare providers 
to fight infection.  Many public health officials suspect that this will lead to policy options that 
aim to incentivize companies to produce new antibiotics to the market. 
There are many barriers to entry within this industry.  Companies interested in entering 
the pharmaceutical market face enormous costs. There is a very high risk when investing in 
research options.  Decisions to continue research of a NME has a direct impact on the company’s 
stability 10 to 15 years into the future.  If a company does not invest in the right research (i.e. a 
NME that is able to successfully be brought to market), they face huge economic repercussions 
from lost R&D.  Behind every blockbuster medication, there are hundreds of failed drugs that 
haven’t been brought to market because they are not safe or effective.34 
New antibiotics entering the market are reserved for the sickest patients as a last-resort 
option, to preserve the medication’s efficacy.35  Industry leaders know that it is very difficult to 
regain the high costs of R&D, because the restricted use of the medication limit returns on 
investment.   It is during this time that the manufacturers work to regain the hundreds of millions 
of dollars that were spent in the research and development of the medication.   
Drug manufacturers argue that the costs of R&D justify the high price tag of brand 
products.  There are several aspects that factor into drug pricing.  (1) The likelihood of failure (2) 
The type of drug: an antibiotic will have shorter clinical trials than an antipsychotic medication 
(3) Whether or not the drug contains a new molecular entity (NME).36 The nature of the 
pharmaceutical industry is to continue to seek a successful and lucrative pipeline of drugs 
coming to market, each with a patent. Once the patent expires—a company loses profits almost 
immediately because a cheaper generic product will replace the brand product.  A company’s 
portfolio must balance future products on the market with the conclusion of patent exclusivity for 
their current drugs on the market.  The risks involved with drug discovery, coupled with the 
safety and efficacy hurdles, are quite large.  Portfolio decisions made today have a direct impact 
on the future of the company 10+ years from now. Today, most commonly used antibiotics have 
surpassed their patent protection periods.  Therefore, the pricing of the most used antibiotics are 
the least expensive. Two policies that provide a platform to ease these economic concerns are the 
ODA and GAIN. 
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2.3 USE OF H.R.5238: ORPHAN DRUG ACT OF 1983 
Historically, incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to invest in less profitable areas of research 
has been done through the Orphan Drug Act. Medications for rare diseases became increasingly 
scarce after safety and efficacy legislation emerged following the thalidomide scandals in the 
1950’s-60’s.37 Thalidomide was prescribed to pregnant women around the world to lessen 
symptoms of morning sickness.38 If the medication was taken within the first trimester, 
significant birth defects occurred.39 While the FDA never approved this drug, it lacked the 
regulatory power to require companies to disclose side effects that arose in clinical trials and 
prove effectiveness before it began large-scale clinical trials.40  The Kefauver Harris Amendment 
to the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1962 transformed the drug approval processes by 
requiring more information be disclosed to the FDA about adverse reactions and efficacy.41 The 
Kefauver Harris Amendment resulted in dramatically safer drug approval practices.  Another, 
perhaps unintended consequence was much higher R&D costs to ensure that drug approval 
applicants were successful.  For example, to successfully demonstrate a product’s safety and 
efficacy, clinical trials needed to be larger and required informed consent of participants.  The 
higher costs lead companies to look for ways to recoup their higher R&D expenses.  One such 
way was to investigate new medications for illnesses that were common, which increases the 
number of potential users.  If the illness was both a chronic illness and common, companies 
could hope to maximize their profits by selling to a larger market for a long period of time.  
People suffering from rare diseases began lobbying their elected representatives for legislation 
that would encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest some of their resources into rare 
illnesses. The Orphan Drug Act was designed with this mindset. 
The ODA grants “orphan drug status” to qualified applicants—it does not give approval 
to a particular medication. When a New Drug Applicant (NDA) receives orphan drug status, it 
qualifies for several benefits, varying by how far the NDA makes it in the drug approval process. 
The regulatory pathway to approval is the same as any other medication, however, federal 
intervention occurs throughout the process to incentivize manufacturers to continue 
development.42  These incentives include direct and indirect financial benefits. The pool of 
potential volunteers for clinical trials is much smaller for rare diseases compared to more 
common diseases. The number of patients required for clinical trials for orphan drugs is smaller 
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than those for more common diseases. Additionally, tax incentives allow the company to allocate 
more capital to orphan drug development.43  Other benefits include extension of exclusivity 
rights, typically an extension of 7 years of protections from any other competition for that 
particular medication—which extends profit-earning opportunities by that timeframe.44 
Subsidies for research are also available. Historically, these benefits have proven to be 
motivating for the pharmaceutical industry.  Many orphan drugs have been developed; including 
several that became blockbuster drugs, meaning they generated revenues in excess of a $1 
billion.45 These drugs include Humira, Abilify, Enbrel, Cialis and Topamax.46 
The most crucial requirement to receiving orphan drug status is providing credible 
documentation that a sponsor’s NDA is meant to treat a disease that affects less than 200,000 
people and that there is a reasonable expectation that a company will be unable to recoup R&D 
costs without federal assistance.47 One can think of the market potential for antibiotics in very 
much the same way that policymakers thought about rare diseases when creating the Orphan 
Drug Act. According to HR 5238, §316.1, antibiotics are mentioned as a candidate for 
submission. 
“(a) This part implements sections 525, 526, 527, and 528 of the act and provides procedures to encourage 
and facilitate the development of drugs for rare diseases or conditions, including biological products and 
antibiotics. This part sets forth the procedures and requirements for: 
(1) Submissions to FDA of: 
(i) Requests for recommendations for investigations of drugs for rare diseases or conditions; 
(ii) Requests for designation of a drug for a rare disease or condition; and 
(iii) Requests for gaining exclusive approval for a drug for a rare disease or condition.” 48 
 
Although antibiotic medications are only mentioned once throughout the legislation, its 
inclusion allows for companies to petition for orphan drug status. A 2013 report from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states that approximately 2 million people a year are 
infected with an infection that is resistant to at least one current antibiotic.49  The most serious 
antibiotic resistant infections kill around 23,000 people a year.50  Pharmaceutical companies can 
make a case that current antibiotics focused on infections that are currently infecting less than 
200,000 people qualify for orphan drug status.51 
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2.4 2012 GAIN ACT: GENERATING ANTIBIOTIC INCENTIVES NOW  
The 2012 GAIN Act is part of the larger Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act.52 Its existence indicates Congress is aware of the growing need for antibiotics.  The Act 
gives incentives to companies that develop QIDP’s. The following criteria for a QIDP 
designation are: 
 “(1) QUALIFIED INFECTIOUS DISEASE PRODUCT.—The term ‘qualified infectious disease product’ 
means an antibiotic drug for treating, detecting, preventing, or identifying a qualifying pathogen.  
 (2) QUALIFYING PATHOGEN.—The term ‘qualifying pathogen’ means—  
(A) resistant gram positive pathogens, including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA), and vancomycin-
resistant enterococcus (VRE);  
(B) multi-drug resistant gram negative bacteria, including Acinetobacter, Klebsiella, 
Pseudomonas, and E. coli species;  
(C) multi-drug resistant tuberculosis; or  
(D) any other infectious pathogen identified for purposes of this section by the 
Secretary.”53 
Among the incentives is the extension of exclusivity rights of 2-5 years (in addition to 
any other exclusivity, such as that from Orphan Drug status) and fast tracking the regulatory 
approval process for new antibiotic therapies.54 An expedited approval process allows antibiotics 
to enter the market and be used much faster, allowing companies to begin recouping their costs 
of drug development.55  
Unfortunately, these incentives do not address the core issue with antibiotics—the 
market. It provides benefits, but they are not enough to motivate companies to re-enter the 
market. If an antibiotic targets a common infection, it will not meet the criteria for orphan drug 
status or the GAIN Act—leaving the R&D cost burden on the pharmaceutical developer. 
Exclusivity is much more appealing when a drug will be used by many people and for longer 
periods of time—allowing companies to gain profits.  Older antibiotics will continue to be 
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prescribed first. Many new antibiotics will be saved for the sickest patients with antibiotic-
resistant infections.  This practice weakens the appeal of extended exclusivity rights. However, 
this Act is most flawed because it does not provide incentives to defray the upfront costs of 
R&D.   
The unmet need for incentives is briefly mentioned within the law.  
“Study on incentives for qualified infectious disease biological products (a) In general.—The 
Comptroller General of the United States shall— (1) Conduct a study on the need for incentives 
to encourage the research, development, and marketing of qualified infectious disease biological 
products; and (2) Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, submit a report 
to the Congress on the results of such study, including any recommendations of the Comptroller 
General on appropriate incentives for addressing such need.”56 
I have been unable to find any report to Congress citing the results of such a study.  The 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), an advisory group that 
councils the president on science and technology issues, released a report in 2014 with 
recommendations to increase the antibiotic pipeline.  While the report covered a number of 
issues surrounding the growing antibiotic crisis, it highlighted the need for additional R&D 
incentives. Among their most feasible recommendations is the development of an Antibiotic 
Incentive Fund to supplement the costs of development through economic push-pull 
mechanisms.57 Federal funding could take the shape of large subsidies to defray the costs of drug 
development (economic push mechanism) or delinking antibiotic usage from the revenue 
companies receive by offering a large financial reward (economic pull mechanism).58 Most 
likely, given the seemingly sustained uncompromising political climate, these economic 
measures are likely to be unpopular, as they directly benefit the pharmaceutical industry. Federal 
incentives were created to counteract an unmet need in the market, and it is important to examine 
if the GAIN Act is truly impacting the pipeline for antibiotics 
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3.0  METHODS 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to quantitatively assess if the 2012 GAIN Act 
provided enough incentives for pharmaceutical companies to place more experimental antibiotic 
treatments into clinical trials. Given the nature of the antibiotics market (an anomaly of normal 
market principles) and the minor incentives offered in GAIN, I suspected that there would be 
some change in antibiotics in clinical trials since this law was enacted.  GAIN offers incentives 
to specific types of antibiotics—new incentives would therefore increase the overall numbers of 
antibiotics in clinical trials. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in the level of antibiotics placed into clinical trials before 
and after the implementation of the GAIN Act  (H0: μ1 = μ2) 
Alternative Hypothesis: There is a difference in the level of antibiotics placed into clinical trials 
before and after the implementation of the GAIN Act. (Ha: μ1 ≠ μ2) 
 Although GAIN only provides benefits to companies who create antibiotics with QIDP 
designations, this analysis was designed to determine if pharmaceutical companies were 
investing in clinical trials for any new antibiotics before and after GAIN. Data collection began 
by reviewing all companies that had an antibiotic in clinical trials from 1/1/2000-12/31/2011. 
Clinicaltrials.gov, company websites (including past pipeline data), the PEW Research Institute’s 
list of current antibiotics in clinical trials, and academic journal articles listing new antibiotics in 
company pipelines were used. 
From 2000-2011, a spreadsheet was created (Appendix A) to track antibiotic R&D using 
the following categories: antibiotic name, company name, date of clinical trials, continued 
development, and a link to the antibiotic on clinicaltrials.gov.  Another spreadsheet was created 
for 2012-2015 (Appendix B).  More information was available for drugs created after 2012 
because of GAIN.  The following categories were expanded to include: antibiotic name, the 
company developing it, potential activity against Gram-Negative ESKAPE Pathogens, QIDP 
 13 
designation, any expected activity against a CDC urgent pathogen, potential indications, 
development phase, continued development, and the link to the antibiotic on Clinicaltrials.gov. 
The following exclusion criteria were used to standardize the data search. 
Inclusion Criteria for 2000-2015 
• Clinical Trials done in the United States 
• Any new antibiotic treatment targeting any type of bacterial infection, including, but not 
limited to, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection, acne, Bacterial 
Vaginosis, etc. 
• New combinations of old antibiotics 
• Any attempt to begin clinical trials—-examining if a company is willing to invest in an 
antibiotic compound when only 1 in 5 will actually be approved 
 
Exclusion Criteria for 2000-2015 
• Clinical trials not conducted within the United States 
• Old antibiotics (developed before 2000) with new delivery methods (i.e. Amikacin 
inhalation (NKTR-061)—Amikacin is an old antibiotic with a new delivery method) 
• New vaccines 
• Tests for risk factors (found in clinicaltrials.gov) 
• Devices 
• New antibiotics not within the study time-period of 2000-2010 
After information gathering, a third Excel spreadsheet was created (Appendix C) to 
condense the data needed to answer the research question. I decided to look at companies that 
made any attempt to begin developing an antibiotic (that met the inclusion criteria) by beginning 
clinical trial on a new antibiotic, which a very expensive undertaking. The data were combined 
and duplicates were eliminated. Each duplicate was re-checked to ensure that it was counted in 
the correct category. The number of medications that each company had in their pipeline in the 
year 2010 and year 2015 was then counted.  Those time-points were chosen for the following 
differences: 
2010: This year provided a marker for a pre-GAIN Act assessment.  The GAIN Act was drafted 
in 2011. Companies could not be sure that a law giving extra incentives would pass through 
Congress.  By 2010, there were growing concerns about antibiotics pipelines from the public. 
The public health community was very aware of the problem.  Despite all of these factors, 2010 
marks a point in time when antibiotic development was not very profitable and there were very 
few incentives.   
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2015: By this time, GAIN has been active for three years.  Companies had time to explore 
options for brining potential antibiotic compounds into trials knowing the incentives offered in 
GAIN. It is also the most current point that had available for research. 
If a company was developing antibiotics, they were included in the data.  If any of those 
companies had an antibiotic in trials (phase I, II, or III) in 2010 that met the inclusion criteria, 
they were counted in 2010.  The same was done for 2015 however they needed to be 
new/different antibiotics than those in the pipeline in 2010.  
The pharmaceutical industry rapidly changes through mergers and acquisitions. As the 
2010 and 2015 data were examined, there were several companies from 2010 that were 
purchased or merged with other companies by 2015.  Excluding these mergers and acquisitions 
outright would skew the data and deliver false results.  Additionally, the inclusion of small 
companies, whose sole purpose is to discover compounds and sell them to larger companies 
could also skew the data.  The following procedure was used to alleviate these issues: 
Any mergers or acquisitions were placed under the purchasing company (ex. Scherling-
Plough merged with Merck&Co. in 2009 under Merck&Co.’s name, therefore, their antibiotic 
pipeline was placed under Merck&Co.)  
Smaller companies who create compounds (sometimes beginning phase I trials) only to 
sell them to larger companies presented a special challenge.  Ultimately, I decided to place each 
compound under the larger company that purchased the compound. These smaller companies are 
inherently different from larger ones that want to bring a medication to market and should not be 
treated in the same way. 
A paired t-test using STATA package 14.0 was used to compare the means of antibiotics 
in clinical trials for each company at the two time points. The paired t-test only allows the 
interpretation of industry behavior by comparing averages of antibiotics in clinical trials before 
and after a law, to get a sense of whether GAIN made any impact on antibiotic development. 
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4.0  DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
The data indicates that there is not a statistically significant difference in antibiotics in clinical 
trials after GAIN was enacted (p-value of 0.0657 at a significance level of 0.05). Table 1 shows 
the number of companies studied (n=59) and the mean antibiotics in clinical trials in year 2010 
and year 2015. 
 
Table 1. Results of Paired T-Test with Merck&Co. Data 
Year 
Companies with 
Antibiotics in Clinical 
Trials 
Mean Antibiotics in 
Clinical Trials 
2010 59 0.88 
2015 59 0.58 
 
Merck&Co. was an outlier with high residual value and moderate leverage (see Appendix 
D).  After studying the boxplots (see Figure 1) and looking into Merck&Co. further, they 
presented as different from the other data because it is an extremely large company who has 
purchased the rights to many antibiotics. Merck is different because they are able to sustain more 
failed clinical trials.  While that is a benefit for more antibiotic development, it does not 
accurately convey the needs or complications of development of the industry as a whole.  Even 
with Merck&Co. removed from the data, there continued to be no statistically significant 
difference in antibiotics in clinical trials after the GAIN Act (P-value of 0.1084 at a significance 
level of 0.05). Figure 2 shows the number of companies studied (n=58) and the mean antibiotics 
in clinical trials in year 2010 and year 2015 when Merck&Co was removed from the data. 
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Table 2. Results of Paired T-Test without Merck&Co. Data 
Year 
Companies with 
Antibiotics in Clinical 
Trials 
Mean Antibiotics in 
Clinical Trials 
2010 58 0.81 
2015 58 0.55 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 2010 and 2015 Boxplots of Antibiotics in Clinical Trials 
 
The years 2010 and 2015 were chosen because they represented two distinctly different 
time-points in antibiotic development legislation.  The GAIN Act was not yet in draft form in 
2010.  2010 was a politically tumultuous year.  President Barack Obama used much of his 
political capital (along with Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate) to push through his healthcare overhaul, known as the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). The ACA received much attention because it radically changed the healthcare 
landscape in the US by prohibiting insurers from denying coverage to individuals with pre-
existing health conditions, requiring insurance of most individuals (without which a fee would be 
collected based on one’s income), and standardizing basic health insurance plans.59  These 
provisions were just a few of the many changes the law made to improve healthcare coverage 
and care in the US.  It was also extremely controversial. Many felt that the new requirements 
were too restrictive, unnecessary and did not cut costs in the right way. At the time, the 
pharmaceutical industry received many incentives in exchange for their support of the bill; 
however, antibiotics incentives were not part of the ACA. These factors meant that 2010 was late 
enough for public health officials to be very concerned about the need for antibiotics, but not for 
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the pharmaceutical industry to be sure that enticing incentives were coming.  Any research or 
development costs would carry the same risks as developing any other medication, but 
reimbursement to recoup costs was still very low.  The only hope of earning higher revenues 
would be through use of the Orphan Drug Act—if the antibiotic treated an infection that affected 
less than 200,000 people. 2010 offered certainty about the need for antibiotics but uncertainty 
about the reimbursement that companies needed to fully invest in antibiotic development. 
The year 2015 offers an example of the post-GAIN Act behaviors.  GAIN had been in 
affect since 2012, but it was introduced in Congress in 2011.60 . Companies have many new 
compounds that they decide not to develop for reasons varying from reimbursement to likelihood 
of success in clinical trials. Since GAIN only offered incentives specific antibiotics (those with 
QIDP status), the hope was that the number of antibiotics in clinical trials would increase, even if 
it was only by those with QIDP status.   
The need for additional incentives is highlighted in the results of the statistical analysis. 
The industry’s resistance to developing new antibiotic development continues, even three years 
after GAIN. Companies had time to begin developing antibiotics that may meet the criteria to 
qualify for GAIN’s benefits, but many chose to continue past behaviors. 
There are two exceptions to these findings.  Compared to other companies interested in 
antibiotic development, Merck&Co. and Pfizer had large numbers of antibiotics in clinical trials 
during 2011 and 2015.  These companies are unique in their drug output and size and are among 
the world’s largest pharmaceutical revenue earners.61 GAIN may have had some impact on their 
antibiotics pipelines, but their high revenues allow them to pursue more risky ventures.  
This analysis has several limitations.  It only looks at two years and there could be 
differences in statistical significance if different years were chosen. This analysis looks at 2015 
as a year to measure the impact of GAIN.  While three years gives pharmaceutical companies 
time to bring antibiotic compounds into clinical trials, it may not have been enough time. The 
data collection that was used to complete the statistical analysis has been made available for 
future studies on this subject (Appendix D). 
Policymakers have several options going forward. PCAST has suggested the following 
options: much higher reimbursement, uncoupling antibiotic use from the revenues received from 
companies, tradable vouchers to extend patent life or market exclusivity of other drugs, and 
antibiotic usage fee to generate funds for any of these programs.62 Each of these options will be 
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costly and likely unpopular with the public. I believe that the most appealing of these options to 
the industry is the tradable vouchers to extend patent life or market exclusivity and an antibiotic 
usage fee to fund the extension of patent life.  This solution offers pharmaceutical companies the 
option to continue charging full price for their blockbuster medications.  The industry is 
predictable, in that they like stability of patent protections.  A patent extension voucher can give 
them a sense of security in a very risky business by offsetting the costs of antibiotic 
development.  There is a longstanding tradition within the industry to extend patents, especially 
those for blockbuster drugs, for as long as possible.  This incentive allows them to choose what 
to extend—which is very tempting.  
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
The counterintuitive nature of the antibiotics market is not easily persuaded by typical incentives. 
Unlike most medications on the market, novel antibiotics are prescribed for short dosage times 
and after older (often generic) versions fail to treat a bacterial infection.  This practice continues 
because antibiotics strip the body of both beneficial and harmful bacteria—making shorter 
prescribing times necessary.  Additionally, antibiotics are treating bacteria that are continually 
modifying themselves to become unaffected by once-effective antibiotics, eventually leaving 
antibiotics useless to fight the newly modified bacteria. This results in a demand for new 
antibiotics but with very little return on investments.  Typical incentives, like those used for 
medications that follow normal market behaviors do not work for antibiotics.  For example, a 
common incentive that is used to stimulate R&D is patent extensions—however, patent 
extensions do not have the same appeal when you are extending the exclusivity of a drug that is 
not used often. 
The lack of incentives for new antibiotics coupled with the overuse of antibiotics in 
medical practice and livestock has lead to an urgent need for more antibiotics—requiring 
policymakers to create incentives beyond those of the ODA and GAIN Act. When looking at the 
amount of antibiotics in clinical trials, both before the enactment of GAIN (2010 data; Appendix 
A) and after (2015 data; Appendix B), there has not been a statistically significant difference in 
the amount of antibiotics in trials. GAIN has not done enough to incentivize the industry to 
create more antibiotics. The policy options proposed by PCAST will help balance the risks and 
benefits of antibiotic R&D, but each will be very expensive and be unpopular the public because 
they will be seen as more beneficial to the pharmaceutical industry. 
It is imperative that this is resolved quickly because medications take several years to 
fully develop and antibiotic resistance is rising daily. If the status quo continues, antibiotics will 
no longer work for common bacterial infections, like strep throat, and infection rates will 
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dramatically increase. Knowing which health policies are effective is an important component of 
public health.  If federal funds will be used to create incentives for antibiotics R&D, it is 
important that those incentives are appropriate. The GAIN Act is only the beginning of a much-
needed financial foundation for antibiotics.  Without which, there will be dire consequences and 
massive disease outbreak that will take many years to resolve. 
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APPENDIX A: 2000-2011 DATA ON ANTIBIOTICS R&D 
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APPENDIX B: 2012-2015 DATA ON ANTIBIOTIC R&D 
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APPENDIX C: ACUMULATIVE DATA FOR ANTIBIOTICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS IN 
2010 AND 2015 
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APPENDIX D: STATA 14.0 OUTPUT 
1. I felt a paired t-test would be an appropriate approach when comparing the means of two time points of pairs. The 
pharmaceutical industry (my “test subjects”) makes a small pool (n), which gets significantly smaller when it is 
narrowed to those creating antibiotics. I wanted a test that I could comfortably interpret and keep control. 
 
2. After I chose a statistical test that fit the data, I began by plotting the data in several ways, through a histogram, 
box plot, and examining the frequencies.  On each of these, there were outliers that needed further investigation to 
determine if they were influencing the data so much so that it could cause yield false results. 
 
 
 
COMMAND:  
histogram var2, discrete frequency ytitle(Pharmaceutical Companies with 
Antibiotics in Trials) xtitle(Number of Antibiotics in Clinical Trials (Phase 
I, II, or III)) title(2010 Data (Before GAIN)) 
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COMMAND: 
histogram var3, discrete frequency ytitle(Pharmaceutical Companies with 
Antibiotics in Trials) xtitle(Number of Antibiotics in Clinical Trials (Phase 
I, II, or III)) title(2015 Data (After GAIN)) 
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COMMAND: 
graph box var2 var3, ytitle(Pharmaceutical Companies with Antibiotics in 
Trials) title(Box Plot: Antibiotics in Trials Before and After GAIN) 
I looked at studentized residuals to identify outliers. I used the predict command with the rstudent to generate the 
studentized residuals. I named the residuals r.  
 
. predict r, rstudent 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. stem r 
 
Stem-and-leaf plot for r (Studentized residuals) 
 
r rounded to nearest multiple of .01 
plot in units of .01 
 
 -1** | 64 
 -1** | 39,35,17,11,10 
 -0** | 95,93,90,89,88,87,83,83,80,77,66,65,59,58,55 
 -0** | 21,20,18,14,10,09,08,05 
  0** | 01,02,03,05,06,11,16,18,19,22,25,27,28,34,35,41,49,49 
  0** | 51,57,60,71,83,99 
  1** | 00,09,17 
  1** | 67 
  2** |  
  2** |  
  3** |  
  3** | 56 
  4** |  
  4** |  
  5** | 24 
 
 
 
*3.56, and 5.24 are most concerning residuals based on the stem and leaf plot (highlighted) 
 
 
While the stem and leaf plot shows some potential outliers, it does not show which company (which 
observations) are potential outliers.  I sorted the data on the residuals to show the 10 biggest and 10 
smallest residuals.  I referred to my master excel sheet to see which companies corresponded with the 
observations that stood out the most. 
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. sort r 
 
. list y1 y2 x r in 1/10 
 
     +--------------------------+ 
     | y1   y2    x           r | 
     |--------------------------| 
  1. |  0    2   59   -1.642414 | 
  2. |  0    2   45    -1.38556 | 
  3. |  0    1   52   -1.351735 | 
  4. |  0    0   48    -1.16521 | 
  5. |  0    1   37   -1.108187 | 
     |--------------------------| 
  6. |  0    0   44   -1.100971 | 
  7. |  0    2   17   -.9508805 | 
  8. |  0    0   33    -.932653 | 
  9. |  0    1   23   -.9009565 | 
 10. |  0    1   22   -.8866526 | 
     +--------------------------+ 
 
. list y1 y2 x r in -10/l 
 
     +-------------------------+ 
     | y1   y2    x          r | 
     |-------------------------| 
 51. |  2    2   55   .7147288 | 
 52. |  2    1   54   .8283903 | 
 53. |  2    0   51   .9866428 | 
 54. |  2    4   27     1.0006 | 
 55. |  2    2   29   1.087434 | 
     |-------------------------| 
 56. |  2    0   38   1.168805 | 
 57. |  2    0    7   1.666753 | 
 58. |  4    0   46   3.560885 |Pfizer 
 59. |  5    2   35   5.243319 |Merck&Co. 
 60. |  .    .    .          . | 
     +-------------------------+ 
 
 
I looked further into companies that had a studentized residual that exceed +2 or -2.  Residuals that exceeded +2.5 or 
-2.5 were more concerning and those that that exceed +3 or -3 are most concerning. These results show company 46 
(Pfizer) with a studentized residual of 3.56 and company 35 (Merck&Co.) with a studentized residual of 5.24, are 
most concerning. 
I read about another way to get similar output through a user-created ado file, called hilo.  I downloaded it and ran it 
on the data as well. 
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. hilo r x 
10 lowest and highest observations on r 
 
  +----------------+ 
  |         r    x | 
  |----------------| 
  | -1.642414   59 | 
  |  -1.38556   45 | 
  | -1.351735   52 | 
  |  -1.16521   48 | 
  | -1.108187   37 | 
  |----------------| 
  | -1.100971   44 | 
  | -.9508805   17 | 
  |  -.932653   33 | 
  | -.9009565   23 | 
  | -.8866526   22 | 
  +----------------+ 
 
  +---------------+ 
  |        r    x | 
  |---------------| 
  | .5967201    3 | 
  | .7147288   55 | 
  | .8283903   54 | 
  | .9866428   51 | 
  |   1.0006   27 | 
  |---------------| 
  | 1.087434   29 | 
  | 1.168805   38 | 
  | 1.666753    7 | 
  | 3.560885   46 |Pfizer 
  | 5.243319   35 |Merck&Co. 
  +---------------+ 
 
Again, company 46 (Pfizer) and 35 (Merck&Co) are concerning. 
 
 
 
. list r x y1 y2 if abs(r) > 2 
 
     +-------------------------+ 
     |        r    x   y1   y2 | 
     |-------------------------| 
 58. | 3.560885   46    4    0 | 
 59. | 5.243319   35    5    2 | 
 60. |        .    .    .    . | 
     +-------------------------+ 
 
 
Above, I wanted to show all variables where the studentized residual exceeds +2 or -2, i.e., where the absolute value 
of the residual exceeds 2.  The data continues to be concerning for the potential outliers identified, Pfizer and 
Merck&Co. Looking carefully at these 2 observations, I went through the data again to ensure that there was not a 
data-entry error. I did not find any.  
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Next, I looked at the leverages to identify observations that could have a potentially large influence.   
 
. predict lev, leverage 
(1 missing value generated) 
. stem lev 
Stem-and-leaf plot for lev (Leverage) 
lev rounded to nearest multiple of .001 
plot in units of .001 
 
0** | 23,24,24,24,24,24,24,25,25,25,26,26,27,27,28,28,29,30,31,31, ... (26) 
0** | 40,41,41,43,44,46,48,50,51,52,53,55,56,57 
0** | 60,61,61,63,63,63,64,65,68,68,68,69,76,78,78 
0** | 95 
1** | 03,17 
1** |  
1** |  
1** |  
1** |  
2** |  
2** |  
2** |  
2** | 70 
 
. lvr2plot, mlabel(x) 
Below are the 5 options on the hilo command to show just the 5 largest observations—again, we see that Allergen 
(lev=.270) has a high leverage, followed by Woodhardt (lev= .117). 
 
. hilo lev x, show(5) high 
5 highest observations on lev 
 
  +---------------+ 
  |      lev    x | 
  |---------------| 
  | .0776795   11 | 
  | .0945704    4 | 
  |   .10334   55 | 
  | .1169525   59 |Woodhardt 
  |  .269714   27 |Allergen 
  +---------------+ 
Based on these results, Pfizer and Merck&Co. did have high leverage—however, Allergen had the largest leverage.  
Because I was interested, I also ran the 10 highest observations, just to be sure the Merck&Co. and Pfizer did not 
have high leverage that I was missing. 
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. hilo lev x, show(10) high 
10 highest observations on lev 
 
  +---------------+ 
  |      lev    x | 
  |---------------| 
  |  .067784   17 | 
  | .0682544    1 | 
  | .0694911    3 | 
  | .0757365   12 | 
  | .0775336   45 | 
  |---------------| 
  | .0776795   11 | 
  | .0945704    4 | 
  |   .10334   55 |Theravance Inc. 
  | .1169525   59 |Woodhardt 
  |  .269714   27 |Allergen 
  +---------------+ 
*Again, Pfizer and Merck&Co. did not come up when I looked at the highest 10 leverage points. 
 
Generally, a point with leverage greater than (2k+2)/n should be fully examined. I examine the companies with the 
highest leverage a bit further. 
 
* k is the number of predictors and n is the number of observations. 
. display (2*2+2)/58 
.10344828 
. list y1 y2 x lev if lev >.103 
 
     +-------------------------+ 
     | y1   y2    x        lev | 
     |-------------------------| 
  1. |  0    2   59   .1169525 |Wockhardt 
 51. |  2    2   55     .10334 |Theravance Inc. 
 54. |  2    4   27    .269714 |Allergen 
 60. |  .    .    .          . | 
     +-------------------------+ 
 
Pfizer and Merck&Co.have large residuals but not large leverage.  Conversely, Allergen (along with Theravance and 
Wockhardt) have small residuals but larger leverage.  
 
Neither have large residuals and large leverage—a combination of the two offers a hint at which points are most 
influential.  
 
I made a plot that shows the leverage by the residual squared and looked for observations that are jointly high on 
both of these measures.   
I did this by using the lvr2plot command (for a leverage versus residual squared plot). Using residual squared 
instead of residual itself, means that the graph is restricted to the first quadrant and the relative positions of data 
points are preserved. This is a way of checking potential influential observations and outliers at the same time. 
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I used a Cook's D to combine the information on the residual and leverage.  
The lowest value that Cook's D can assume is zero, and the higher the Cook's D is, the more influential the point. 
The conventional cut-off point is 4/n. 
 
. predict d1, cooksd 
(1 missing value generated) 
 
. clist x y1 y2 d1 if d1>4/58, noobs 
 
       x        y1        y2         d1 
     27         2         4   .1232539  Allergen 
      35         5         2   .4216602  Merck&Co. 
      46         4         0   .1369645  Pfizer 
      59         0         2   .1155847  Woodhardt 
       .         .         .          . 
 
 
 
 
Merk&Co. has consistently been a concern throughout the analysis of the data.  I decided to run a paired t-test both 
with and without them. 
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Paired T-Test With Merck&Co. 
. ttest y1== y2 
 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      y1 |      59    .8813559    .1234719     .948406       .6342    1.128512 
      y2 |      59    .5762712     .116453    .8944925    .3431652    .8093772 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      59    .3050847    .1626315    1.249196   -.0204575     .630627 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(y1 - y2)                                   t =   1.8759 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       58 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9671         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0657          Pr(T > t) = 0.0329 
 
 
 
 
Paired T-Test Without Merck&Co. 
 
 
. ttest y1_01== y2_01 
 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   y1_01 |      58    .8103448    .1027654    .7826383    .6045606    1.016129 
   y2_01 |      58    .5517241    .1158164    .8820314    .3198058    .7836425 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      58    .2586207    .1585635    1.207583   -.0588972    .5761386 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(y1_01 - y2_01)                             t =   1.6310 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       57 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9458         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1084          Pr(T > t) = 0.0542 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paired T-Test without Merck and Pfizer 
 
. ttest y1_02== y2_02 
 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   y1_02 |      57     .754386    .0877193    .6622662    .5786631    .9301088 
   y2_02 |      57    .5614035     .117454    .8867586    .3261148    .7966922 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      57    .1929825    .1468948    1.109031   -.1012831     .487248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(y1_02 - y2_02)                             t =   1.3137 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       56 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
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 Pr(T < t) = 0.9029         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1943          Pr(T > t) = 0.0971 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paired T-Test without Merck, Pfizer, and Allergen 
 
. ttest y1_03== y2_03 
 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   y1_03 |      56    .7321429    .0863813    .6464187    .5590308    .9052549 
   y2_03 |      56          .5    .1019294    .7627701    .2957288    .7042712 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      56    .2321429    .1441299    1.078569   -.0566999    .5209856 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(y1_03 - y2_03)                             t =   1.6107 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       55 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9435         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1130          Pr(T > t) = 0.0565 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
Research Question: Has the GAIN Act provided enough incentives for Pharmaceutical Company’s to place more 
experimental antibiotic treatments into clinical trials? Given the nature of antibiotics market (an anomaly of regular 
market princples), I suspect that there has not been much change in the amount of antibiotics in clinical trials since 
this law was enacted. 
 
Null Hypothesis— H0: μ1 = μ2 
 
Alternative Hypothesis— Ha: μ1 ≠ μ2 
 
Interpretation of Results 
The p-value is above O.05 in all three t-tests (all data, data without Merck&Co, and data without Pfizer and 
Merck&Co.).  Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.  The data indicates that there is no statistically 
significant difference in antibiotics in clinical trials after the GAIN act. 
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